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Allowing Sentence Bargains to Fall Outside of
the Guidelines Without Valid Departures: It is
Time for the Commission to Act
by
JOHN M. DICK*
[Tihe Guidelines... have made charlatans and dissemblers of us all.
We spend our time plotting and scheming, bending and twisting, dis-
torting and ignoring the law in an effort to achieve a just result. All
under the banner of "truth in sentencing!"1
Introduction
In 1984, Congress passed the Sentencing Reform Act ("Sentencing
Act")2 as a way of restructuring judicial scrutiny and reducing unwar-
ranted disparity among the federal circuits.' The Sentencing Act granted
Congress the power to create the United States Sentencing Commission
("Commission"). 4 Pursuant to the Sentencing Act, the Commission
promulgated the United States Sentencing Guidelines ("Guidelines"). 5
The Guidelines went into effect on November 1, 1987.6
" J.D. Candidate, 1998, University of California, Hastings College of the Law; M.B.A.
Candidate, 1998, University of California at Berkeley, Haas School of Business; B.A., 1990,
Yale University.
1. Jack B. Weinstein, Comment, A Trial Judge's Second Impression of the Federal Sen-
tencing Guidelines, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 357, 365 (1992).
2. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. 11, 98 Stat. 1837 (1984)
(codified as 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3742 (1994 & Supp. 1996); 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998 (1994 &
Supp. 1996)).
3. See Ilene H. Nagel & Stephen J. Schulhofer, A Tale of Three Cities: An Empirical
Study of Charging and Bargaining Practices Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 66 S.
CAL. L. REv. 501, 501 (1992).
4. 28 U.S.C. § 991(a) (1994 & Supp. 1996).
5. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (1984) (codified
as 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3742; 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998).
6. See S. REP. No. 98-225 at 189 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3372.
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The Guidelines sought to change the practice of plea bargaining only
slightly.7 They explicitly state that Rule 11(e) of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure continues to "govern the acceptance or rejection of
[plea] agreements."' On its face, Rule 11(e) appears to give federal
courts the absolute power to accept or reject plea bargain agreements that
provide for specific prison sentences. 9 Accordingly, some circuits have
used this authority to sanction so-called "sentence bargains" that circum-
vent the mandatory ranges set forth in the Guidelines. 0
However, in order to provide guidance to the courts, the Guidelines
also set forth "general policy statements concerning the acceptance of
plea agreements . . . ."" These policy statements explicitly prohibit
courts from accepting plea bargains that deviate from the sentences pro-
vided for in the Guidelines.12 Therefore, courts that are accepting sen-
tence bargains that contravene the Guidelines are engaging in a practice
that is explicitly prohibited by these policy statements. Other circuits, by
deferring to the Commission's policy statements, refuse to accept specific
sentence agreements unless they comport with the Guidelines. 3
Because of these conflicting interpretations, an inter-circuit split has
developed with regard to the acceptance of specific, binding sentence
agreements.14 While there is no argument about the existing conflict be-
tween Rule 11(e) and the policy statements, there remains doubt as to
which should be given controlling weight.1 5 Courts that sanction sentence
bargains that fall outside of the Guidelines simply assume that the general
nature of the policy statements-as opposed to the mandatory nature of
7. See infra notes 157-59 and accompanying text.
8. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A, Intro. 4(c) (West 1995) [here-
inafter GUIDELINES MANUAL].
9. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 1l(e)(2) ("[A] court may accept or reject the agreement, or
may defer its decision as to the acceptance or rejection until there has been an opportunity to
consider the presentence report.") (emphasis added); see infra notes 220-25 and accompanying
text.
10. See infra notes 243-61 and accompanying text.
11. GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 8, ch. 1, pt. A, Intro. 4(c) (emphasis added).
12. Id. at §§ 6B1.2. (The Commission stated that "if the policy statements relating to plea
agreements are followed, circumvention of the Sentencing Reform Act and the [G]uidelines
should not occur." Id. at ch. 1, pt. A, Intro. 4(c)).
13. See infra notes 262-75 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 243-75 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 234-41 and accompanying text.
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the specific Guidelines-does not make the policy statements binding on
the courts.
16
By allowing prosecutors and defense counsel to agree to sentence
bargains that violate the Gfiidelines, courts are undermining the purposes
set forth by Congress and the Commission. 7 Additionally, because sen-
tence bargaining is done largely "behind the scenes," there is a real dan-
ger that this practice will develop into a significant loophole in the
Guidelines. 18
This Note-in Parts I, 11, and rH-will provide a general history of
the Guidelines, a general explanation of how they work, and a brief
overview of the major problems that continue to plague our federal courts
under the current system. Part IV will describe the practice of plea bar-
gaining under the Guidelines. Part V will specifically analyze the conflict
between Rule 11(e) and the policy statements relating to sentence bar-
gaining. Finally, this Note will conclude with the argument that it is time
for the Commission, and Congress, to pass a new Guideline (as opposed
to a mere policy statement) that prohibits prosecutors and defense counsel
from entering into specific sentence agreements that circumvent the exix-
ting Guidelines. Under the current Guidelines, there exist sufficient in-
centives which continue to induce defendants to engage in plea bargain-
ing. 9 This solution will effectively eliminate the loophole while keeping
the important practice of plea bargaining an integral part of our criminal
system.
I. History of Guidelines
A. Background
(1) The Sentencing Act
The Sentencing Act, passed as part of the Comprehensive Crime
Control Act of 1984,' was intended by Congress to "further the basic
purposes of criminal punishment: deterrence, incapacitation, just pun-
16. See infra notes 243-61 and accompanying text; see also William W. Wilkins, Jr., Plea
Negotiations, Acceptance of Responsibility, Role of the Offender, and Departures: Policy Deci-
sions in the Promulgation of Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 23 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 181,
187 (1988).
17. See infra notes 276-77 and accompanying text.
18. Id.
19. See infra notes 284-300 and accompanying text.
20. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. II, 98 Stat. 1837 (1984)
(codified as 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3742 ; 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998).
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ishment, and rehabilitation." 2' The Sentencing Act was Congress' re-
sponse to the wide disparity of sentencing that had developed among fed-
eral circuits. Under the prior indeterminate sentencing system, judges
readily exercised their discretion in imposing "dramatically different
sentences on similarly situated defendants."' This amount of judicial
discretion, combined with differing sentencing ideologies, resulted in
prison sentences-resulting from the same crime-that could range from
ten years to twenty years.' The Hearings Before the Subcommittee on
Criminal Justice indicated that:
[T]he region in which the defendant is convicted is likely to change the
length of time served from approximately six months more if one is
sentenced in the South to. twelve months less if one is sentenced in Cen-
tral California .... [F]emale bank robbers are likely to serve six
months less than their similarly situated male counterparts... [and]
black [bank robbery] defendants convicted ... in the South are likely to
actually serve approximately thirteen months longer than similarly situ-
ated bank robbers convicted ... in other regions.
24
This legislation represented a deliberate attempt by Congress to
eliminate this unguided, unreviewable, and virtually unfettered judicial
discretion. It hoped to move toward "a process of accountability, greater
uniformity, and articulated reasons for punishment. "'
(2) The Commission
The Sentencing Act established the Sentencing Commission-a body
composed of seven voting members and one non-voting member.26 At
least three of the members are federal judges.27 All members are ap-
pointed by the President "by and with the advice and consent of the Sen-
ate," and they are "subject to removal from the Commission by the
President only for neglect of duty or malfeasance in office or for other
21. GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 8, ch. 1, pt. A, Intro. 2.
22. See Elizabeth A. Parsons, Note, Shifting the Balance of Power: Prosecutorial Discre-
tion Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 29 VAL. U. L. REv. 417, 429-30 (1994) (ex-
plaining how prosecutors gained sentencing discretion due to the Sentencing Reform Act).
23. S. Rep. No. 98-225 at 41 n.22 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3224
(citing A. Partridge & W. Eldridge, The Second Circuit Sentencing Study: A Report to the
Judges 1-3 (1974)).
24. Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises Upon
Which They Rest, 17 HOFsTRA L. Rv. 1, 5 (1988).
25. Wilkins, supra note 16, at 181.




good cause shown."2' The members are appointed for a term of six years
and cannot serve more than two terms.29 The Commission's principal
purpose is to "establish sentencing policies and practices for the Federal
criminal justice system that [will]... provide certainty and fairness in
meeting the purposes of sentencing... while maintaining sufficient
flexibility to permit individualized sentences when warranted .... "30
(3) The Guidelines
Pursuant to its Congressional mandate, the Commission created the
Sentencing Guidelines,31 which were submitted to Congress in April
1987, and enacted into law on November 1, 1987.32 Simply put, the
Guidelines establish sentencing ranges which are based on various of-
fender and offense categories. 3 Each sentencing range's maximum
prison term cannot exceed the minimum by more than twenty-five percent
or six months-whichever is greater.3 4
Since the promulgation of the Guidelines, reaction to their existence
has been predominantly negative. 5 Some of this criticism has focused on
"the harsh punishment-by-lengthy-incarceration scheme of the
[G]uidelines"3 6 and the effect that such a scheme has had on the already
overcrowded federal prison system. 37 Other scholars point to the detri-
mental effect that the Guidelines have had on the process of plea bar-
gaining. Because the charges imposed upon the defendant "nearly dictate
the sentence of the defendant," many submit that the Guidelines grant
federal prosecutors too much power over the sentencing process.3 ' Ac-
cording to one federal court, the shift of power from the judge to the
28. See id.
29. See 28 U.S.C. § 992(a) (1994 & Supp. 1996).
30. 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B) (1994 & Supp. 1996).
31. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (1984) (codified
as 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3742; 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998).
32. See S. REP. No. 98-225 at 189 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3372.
33. See infra notes 55-82 and accompanying text.
34. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(b)(2) (1994 & Siupp. 1996).
35. See Ami L. Feinstein et al., Federal Sentencing, 30 AM. CRiM. L. REv. 1079, 1114
(1993).
36. Weinstein, supra note 1, at 365.
37. See Jack B. Weinstein, A Trial Judge's First Impression of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, 52 ALB. L. REV. 1, 19 (1987).
38. See Feinstein et al., supra note 35, at 1115.
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prosecutor "may be the most fundamental change in the criminal justice
system to have occurred within the last generation.""
The Guidelines, however, have survived despite their critics. The
Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of the Commission and
the Guidelines,' and at the end of this year, the system will have been in
place for one decade. Because it seems as though the Guidelines are here
to stay, it is important to understand why they exist, how they work, and
the various practices they continue to influence.
B. The Commission's Stated Goals
Congress had three main purposes when it enacted the Sentencing
Act.4 The first was "honesty in sentencing."'42 Prior to the implementa-
tion of the Guidelines, a judge could sentence an offender to a certain
term, only to have the Parole Commission reduce the sentence drasti-
cally.43 The consequences of this practice "sometimes fooled the judges,
sometimes disappointed the offender, and often misled the public."" The
Commission's solution to this problem was simple: it abolished parole.45
According to the Commission, "the abolition of parole makes the sen-
tence imposed by the court the sentence the offender will serve, less ap-
proximately fifteen percent for good behavior."46
The second purpose of the Commission was uniformity; it hoped to
eliminate the vast sentencing disparity present among offenders and fed-
eral circuits.47 The Commission's solution to this problem was to provide
a system of mandatory Guidelines for all federal circuits based on of-
fender and offense classifications.4"
39. Bennett L. Gershman, Prosecutorial Discretion Under Federal Sentencing Guidelines,
N.Y.L.J., Apr. 20, 1990, at 1 (quoting United States v. Roberts, 726 F. Supp. 1359, 1363
(D.D.C. 1989), rev'd on other grounds, United States v. Mills, 925 F.2d 455 (D.C. Cir.
1991).
40. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 379 (1989) ("Developing proportionate
penalties for hundreds of different crimes by a virtually limitless array of offenders is precisely
the sort of intricate, labor-intensive task for which delegation to an expert body is especially
appropriate.")
41. See GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 8, ch. 1, pt. A, Intro. 3.
42. See id. (emphasis added).
43. See Breyer, supra note 24, at 4.
44. Id.
45. See GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 8, ch. 1, pt. A, Intro. 3.
46. Id.
47. See id.; see also Breyer, supra note 24, at 4-5.
48. See 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B).
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Third, the Commission sought to maintain proportionality "through
a system that imposes appropriately different sentences for criminal con-
duct of differing severity. "49 It recognized, however, the inherent con-
tradictions between the goals of uniformity and proportionality.0 On one
hand, a system based on simple uniformity (e.g., every criminal receives
the same sentence) would destroy proportionality.5 On the other hand, a
system which attempted to categorize every conceivable permutation re-
lating to criminal activity would be totally unworkable.52
In an attempt to reconcile these conflicting goals, the Commission
took a middle ground and "used an empirical approach to create the new
sentencing system."53 It relied on historical data, criminal statutes, and
other relevant data to come up with what are known today as the "Guide-
lines. "
54
HI. Basic Structure of the Guidelines
A. The Guidelines Scheme
The backbone of the Guidelines is the Sentencing Table (Table)-a
sophisticated grid of 258 cells. The "y-axis" of the Table consists of 43
"[o]ffense [l]evels;" the "x-axis" is made up of six "[c]riminal [h]istory
[c]ategories." The cells represent a "'heartland,' a set of typical cases
embodying the conduct that each [G]uideline describes." 56 Ideally, the
Guidelines affix an appropriate sentence for each class of convicted per-
sons determined by coordinating the respective offense level and criminal
history category.
A district court must impose a sentence within the applicable heart-
land, "unless the court finds that there exists an aggravating or mitigating
circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consid-




53. Feinstein et al., supra note 35, at 1082.
54. See GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 8, ch. 1, pt. A, Intro. 3 ("[The Commission]
analyzed data drawn from 10,000 presentence investigations, the differing elements of various
crimes as distinguished in substantive criminal statutes, the United States Parole Commission's
guidelines and statistics, and data from other relevant sources in order to determine which dis-
tinctions were important in pre-[Gluidelines practice. After consideration, the Commission ac-
cepted, modified, or rationalized these distinctions.").
55. Id. at ch. 5, pt. A ("Sentencing Table").
56. Id. at ch. 1, pt. A, Intro. 4(b).
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eration by the Sentencing Commission .... "7 By using this method,
the Commission hoped that offenders with similar criminal histories, that
are convicted of similar crimes, under similar circumstances, would re-
ceive roughly the same sentence.
B. Application of the Guidelines
To better understand the how the Guidelines work, it is helpful to
consider an example. Assume that a defendant has been convicted of
criminal sexual abuse on a fourteen year-old victim. Assume, also, that
the offender had one prior conviction that imposed a prison sentence of
fourteen months. The district court judge, aided by a probation officer's
presentence report, would go through the following steps to determine the
offender's sentence."
The initial task to be performed by the court is that of determining
the applicable offense level-the "y-axis" of the Table-for the crime."
This entails consideration of the offense charged, the conduct constituting
elements of the offense charged, and the totality of the "relevant con-
duct." 6' In this example, the court first would be led to Guideline §
2A3.1, Criminal Sexual Abuse, which imposes a base offense level of
27.61 Then, the court would have to look for and apply any specific of-
fense characteristics relating to the crime. 2 For this hypothetical, the
court would increase the offense level by two levels.' Third, the court
would determine if any "Chapter Three" adjustments apply. 64 These
57. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1994 & Supp. 1996).
58. See GUIDELINES MANUAL, sitpra note 8, §§ 1B1.1(a)-(i).
59. Id. at § 1.B1.2(a).
60. "'Relevant Conduct'" includes: all acts and omissions committed, aided, abetted,
counseled, commanded, induced, procured, or willfully caused by the defendant ... that oc-
curred during the commission of the offense of conviction, in preparation for that offense, or in
the course of attempting to avoid detection or responsibility for that offense." Id. at §
1B1.3(a)(1); see also David A. Forkner, Tenth Circuit Survey: The United States Sentencing
Guidelines, 73 DENY. U. L. REv. 963, 965-66 (1996).
61. Id. at § 2A3.1(a) ("Criminal Sexual Abuse; Attempt to Commit Criminal Sexual
Abuse").
62. Id. at § 1.B1.1(b).
63. See id. at § 2A3.1(b)(2) ("If the victim had not attained the age of twelve years, in-
crease by 4 levels; or if the victim had attained the age of twelve years but had not attained the
age of sixteen years, increase by 2 levels.").
64. Id. at § 1B1.1(c).
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consist of victim-related adjustments,' role in the offensej obstruction,67
multiple counts,' or acceptance of responsibility.69 For the purposes of
this example, we will assume that no "Chapter Three" adjustments apply.
The court must then determine the applicable criminal history cate-
gory-the "x-axis" of the grid.7' This area of the Guidelines reflects the
Commission's finding that recidivist criminals are more culpable than
first-time offenders and, thus, should be subject to greater penalties.71
Specifically, the Commission found:
A defendant with a record of prior criminal behavior is more culpable
than a first offender and thus deserving of greater punishment. General
deterrence of criminal conduct dictates that a clear message be sent to
society that repeated criminal behavior will aggravate the need for pun-
ishment with each recurrence. To protect the public from further
crimes of the particular defendant, the likelihood of recidivism and fu-
ture criminal behavior must be considered. Repeated criminal behavior
is an indicator of a limited likelihood of successful rehabilitation.
72
In our hypothetical, the offender would receive three points under §
4A1.1, 73 and he would have a corresponding criminal history category of
11.
74
The district court judge now turns to Chapter Five, Part A (wherein
resides the Table) so that she may calculate the appropriate Guideline
range.75 Chapter Five of the Guidelines authorizes alternative punish-
ments for various categories of offenders and offenses; they consist of
probation,76 imprisonment, 7 supervised release,78 and restitution. 79  To
65. Id. at ch. 3, pt. A ("Victim-Related Adjustments"). This section pertains to Hate
Crime Motivation or Vulnerable Victim, Official Victim, Restraint of Victim, and International
Terrorism. Id. at §§ 3AL.1-3A1.4.
66. Id. at ch. 3, pt. B ("Role in the Offense"). This section pertains to Aggravating Role,
Mitigating Role, Abuse of Position of Trust or Use of Special Skill, and Using a Minor to
Commit a Crime. Id. at §§ 3Bl.1-3B1.4.
67. Id. at ch. 3, pt. C ("Obstruction"). This section pertains to Obstructing or Impeding
the Administration of Justice and Reckless Endangerment During Flight. Id. at §§ 3C1.1-
3C1.2.
68. Id. at §§ 3DI.1-3D1.5.
69. See id. at § 3EL. 1 ("Acceptance of Responsibility").
70. Id. at § 1B1.1(f).
71. Id. at ch. 4, pt. A, Intro. Comment.
72. Id.
73. Id. at § 4A1.1(a) ("Add 3 points for each prior sentence of imprisonment exceeding
one year and one month.").
74. See id. at ch. 5, pt. A ("Sentencing Table").
75. Id. at § 1B.1(g).
76. See id. at ch. 5, pt. B.
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continue using the above example, our offender would have an offense
level of 29 and a criminal history category of II.8" He, therefore, would
be facing a prison term of 97 - 121 months.81 Reaching this stage of the
process by no means signals the end of the court's analysis, for the dis-
trict judge must now consider whether the characteristics of the offense




When the Guidelines were being formulated, the Commission re-
ceived varying opinions with regard to the issue of departures. While
some advocated that the Commission adopt "an inflexible system which
left little or no room for departure, . . . others suggested a presumptive
sentence approach with great latitude for departure. "83 In the end, the
Commission took a middle-ground approach." Accordingly, the Guide-
lines permit a district judge to depart from the applicable Guideline range
if she "finds that there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance
of a kind, or to a degree, that was not adequately taken into consideration
by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the [G]uidelines and should
result in a sentence different from that described."85 One of the justifica-
tions for this policy is that "it is difficult to prescribe a single set of
[G]uidelines that encompasses the vast range of human conduct poten-
tially relevant to a sentencing decision."86 Therefore, the Guidelines
specify a number of aggravating and mitigating grounds for both upward
and downward departures.87
77. See id. at ch. 5, pt. C.
78. See id. at ch. 5, pt. D.
79. See id. at ch. 5, pt. E. This section includes guidance relating to the imposition of
fines. See id. at § 5E1.2.
80. See supra notes 60-69, 73-74 and accompanying text.
81. See GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 8, at ch. 5, pt. A ("Sentencing Table").
82. Id. at § 1B1.1(i).
83. Wilkins, supra note 16, at 195.
84. See id.
85. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1994 & Supp. 1996).
86. GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 8, ch. 1, pt. A, Intro. 4(b).
87. See id. at §§ 5K1.l-5K2.18. The listed grounds for departure are: Substantial Assis-
tance to Authorities; Death; Physical Injury; Extreme Psychological Injury; Abduction or Un-
lawful Restraint; Property Damage or Loss; Weapons and Dangerous Instrumentalities; Disrup-
tion of Governmental Function; Extreme Conduct; Criminal Purpose; Victim's Conduct; Lesser
Harms; Coercion and Duress; Diminished Capacity; Public Welfare; Voluntary Disclosure of
Offense; High-Capacity, Semiautomatic Firearms; and Violent Street Gangs.
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This approach attempts to accommodate the countervailing needs for
uniform punishment and flexibility for the unique offense and offender.8"
To avoid the problem of unwarranted disparity, a district court judge
must "consider only the [S]entencing [G]uidelines, policy statements, and
official commentary of the Sentencing Commission" when determining
whether a circumstance was adequately considered in the creation of the
Table.89  Additionally, pursu~ftto -§ 3553(c), the court must specify its
reasons for departure.'-
D. Acceptance of Responsibility and Substantial Assistance
Two areas of the Guidelines are particularly relevant with regard to
the current practice of plea bargaining in the federal criminal system.
The first of these is "acceptance of responsibility,"'" a "Chapter Three"
adjustment covered under § 3El. 1 of the Guidelines.' The second is
"substantial assistance,"' a departure governed by § 5Kl.1 in the
Guidelines.' It is important to note that the acceptance of responsibility
and substantial assistance are "distinct and separate" from one another.95
While acceptance of responsibility can entitle a defendant to no more than
a three-level offense level reduction,' substantial assistance can result in
a more substantial downward departure.'
88. Wilkins, supra note 16, at 196:
89. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1994 & Supp. 1996); United States v. Barber, 93 F.3d 1200,
1204 (4th Cir. 1996).
90. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(2) (1994 & Supp. 1996) ("The court, at the time os sentencing,
shall state in open court the reasons for its imposition of the particular sentence, and, if the
sentene ... is not of the kind, or is outside the [Guideline range], the specific reason for the
imposition of a sentence different from that described.").
91. See infra notes 98-108 and accompanying text.
92. GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 8, § 3E1.l(a) ("If the defendant clearly demon-
strates acceptance of responsibility for his offense, decrease the offense level by 2 levels." (em-
phasis in original)). If the original offense level "is level 16 or greater, and the defendant has
assisted authorities in the investigation or prosecution of his own misconduct," the judge may
decrease the offense level by an additional level. Id. at § 3EL.l(b).
93. See infra notes 109-19 and accompanying text.
94. GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 8, § 5Kl.1 ("Upon motion of the government stat-
ing that the defendant has provided substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of
another person who has committed an offense, the court may depart from the [Gluidelines.").
The substantial assistance departure is authorized by 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) (1994 & Supp. 1996)
and 28 U.S.C. § 994(n) (1994 & Supp. 1996).
95. Daniel J. Sears, Practice Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Bargaining for
Freedom, 22 CoLO. LAW. 485, 485 (1993).
96. GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 8, §§ 3EL.1(a)-3EL.1(b).
97. See id. at § 5K1.1; Sears, supra note 95, at 485.
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(1) Acceptance of Responsibility, § 3E1.1
Some recognize acceptance of responsibility as the only significant
incentive for a defendant to enter a guilty plea. 98 Under the Guidelines,
an offender may be entitled to a two-level reduction under § 3E1.L if he
"clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsibility for his offense."' A
defendant can demonstrate acceptance of responsibility by: truthfully ad-
mitting to his conduct;"° voluntarily terminating criminal conduct or as-
sociations; TM voluntarily paying restitution prior to adjudication of
guilt; 102 voluntarily surrendering to authorities; 3 voluntarily assisting
authorities in recovering fruits or instrumentalities of the offense; " 4 vol-
untarily resigning from the office or position held during the commission
of the offense;"°5 or engaging in post-offense rehabilitative efforts.'06
A defendant may also be entitled to an additional one-level reduction
if he timely provides complete information regarding his involvement in
the offense, or if he timely notifies the authorities of his intention to enter
a guilty plea." The existence of these downward adjustments clearly in-
dicates that the Commission recognized that "pleas [are] an acceptable
and important element in the sentencing process."' 08
(2) Substantial Assistance, § 5KJ.1
The substantial assistance departure" is based on the Commission's
finding that a "defendant's assistance to authorities in the investigation of
criminal activities has been recognized in practice and by statute as a
mitigating sentencing factor."11 Although it is analytically distinct from
acceptance of responsibility,"' which is primarily used only when defen-
98. Ellen M. Bryant, Comment, Section 3E1.1 of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Bar-
gaining with the Guilty, 44 CATH. U. L. REV. 1269, 1275 (1995).
99. GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 8, § 3EL.1(a).
100. Id. at § 3E1.1, Comment. (n.l(a)).
101. Id. at § 3E1.1, Comment. (n.l(b)).
102. Id. at § 3E1.1, Comment. (n.l(c)).
103. Id. at § 3E1.1, Comment. (n.l(d)).
104. Id. at § 3E1.1, Comment. (n.l(e)).
105. Id. at § 3E1.1, Comment. (n.l(f)).
106. Id. at § 3E1.1, Comment. (n.l(g)).
107. Id. at §§ 3E1.L(b)(1)-3EL.I(b)(2).
108. Bryant, supra note 98, at 1274.
109. GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 8, § 5K1.1.
110. Id. at § 5K1.1, Comment.
111. One major difference between the substantial assistance departure and the acceptance
of responsibility reduction is that while the former is dependent upon a motion by the Govern-
[Vol. 48
dants enter a guilty plea, the substantial assistance departure offers a
method of achieving many of the same results.
112
The factors that a court should consider when deciding whether a
substantial assistance departure is appropriate include: the court's
evaluation of the significance and usefulness of the defendant's assis-
tance;113  the truthfulness, completeness and reliability of information
provided by the defendant; 14 the nature and the extent of the defendant's
assistance;" 5 any injury or risk of injury to the defendant or his family
resulting from his assistance;16 and the timeliness of the defendant's as-
sistance.117
In order for a court to depart from the Guidelines on the basis of
substantial assistance, a motion by the Government must be made."'
Additionally, it is important to note that an acceptance of responsibility
reduction in no way precludes a departure for substantial assistance;
rather, the Guidelines state that substantial assistance must be considered
independently of acceptance of responsibility." 9
E. Probation Officer and Presentence Report
The presentence procedures in place before the enactment of the
Guidelines remain largely untouched.'O Rule 32 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure continues to outline the practices for presentenc-
ing.'' First, a probation officer views the prosecution's files and pre-
ment, the latter is not. Sears, supra note 95, at 485-86 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) (1996)); see
also United States v. Fleener, 900 F.2d 914, 917-18 (6th Cir. 1990).
112. See Stephen J. Schulhofer & Ilene H. Nagel, Negotiated Pleas Under the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines: The First Fifteen Months, 27 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 231, 246 (1989).
113. GUIDELINEs MANUAL, supra note 8, § 5K1.l(a)(1).
114. Id. at § 5Kl.1(a)(2).
115. Id. at § 5K1.1(a)(3).
116. Id. at § 5KL.1(a)(4).
117. Id. at § 5KL.(a)(5).
118. See id. at § 5Kl.1; United States v. Kaye, 65 F.3d 240, 242 (2d Cir. 1995); United
States v. Love, 985 F.2d 732, 736 (3d Cir. 1993); United States v. Emery, 34 F.3d 911, 913
(9th Cir. 1994).
119. § 5K1.1 n.2 ("The sentencing reduction for assistance to authorities shall be consid-
ered independently of any reduction for acceptance of responsibility. Substantial assistance is
directed to the investigation and prosecution of criminal activities by persons other than the de-
fendant, while acceptance of responsibility is directed to the defendant's affirmative recognition
of responsibility for his own conduct.").
120. Feinstein et al., supra note 35, at 1084.
121. 18 U.S.C. § 3552(a) (1994 & Supp. 1996); FED. R. CalM. P. 32(b)(4) (stating that a
presentence report must contain: information about the defendant's history and characteristics;
the classification of the offense and of the defendant under the categories established by the
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pares a presentence investigation report (PSI)." 2 Then, the probation of-
ficer interviews the defendant."n Depending on the circumstances, this
procedure may or may not affect the contents of the PSI.124 The defen-
dant's sentence is then calculated by determining the base offense level,
adjusting the level if appropriate, and categorizing the criminal history
level."n Finally, a copy of the PSI is delivered to the court, the prosecu-
tion, and the defense.126
Upon viewing the Guidelines, it seems clear that they require the re-
sults of the presentence report to be reported to the court before the im-
position of a sentence. 127 Policy statement § 6B1.1(c) clearly states as
much:
The court shall defer its decision to accept or reject any nonbinding rec-
ommendation pursuant to Rule 11(e)(1)(B), and the court's decision to
accept or reject any plea agreement pursuant to Rules 11(e)(1)(A) and
11(e)(1)(C) until there has been an opportunity to consider the presen-
tence report, unless a report is not required under § 6A1. 1.12
Additionally, the Commentary to this section of the Guidelines fur-
ther stipulates that a "court must defer acceptance of the plea agreement
until the court has had an opportunity to consider the presentence re-
port." 29 However, because of the permissive language found in Rule
11 (e)(2), 3 courts are divided as to whether a judge is required to view
the presentence report before deciding upon a sentence."' This conflict
Sentencing Commission; a reference to any pertinent policy statement issued by the Sentencing
Commission; information relating to the financial, social, psychological, or medical impact on
any individual; nature and extent of nonprison programs, if appropriate; a recommendation; and
any other information required by the court).
122. Parsons, supra note 22, at 438.
123. Id. at 438.
124. Id. at 439.
125. See supra notes 60-74 and accompanying text.
126. Parsons, supra note 22, at 440.
127. 18 U.S.C. § 3552(a) (1994 & Supp. 1996) ("A United States probation officer shall
make a presentence investigation of a defendant that is required pursuant to the provisions of
Rule 32(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and shall, before the imposition of sen-
tence, report the results of the investigation to the court.") (emphasis added).
128. GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 8, § 6Bl.l(c).
129. Id. at § 6B1.1, Comment (emphasis added).
130. Rule 11(e)(2) states that a court "may accept or reject the agreement." FED. R.
CRIM. P. 11(e)(2) (emphasis added).
131. See United States v. Ruch, 906 F. Supp. 261, 263 (E.D. Pa. 1995) ("The mandatory
language of section 6B1.1(c), however, contradicts the permissive language of Rule 11(e)(2) of
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (emphasis added). Rule 11(e)(2) provides
that, '... the court may accept or reject the agreement, or may defer its decision as to the ac-
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seems highly unusual, considering that, according to the Guidelines,
judges are obligated to sentence within the applicable range unless they
can explicate a valid reason for departure."'
This issue becomes particularly problematic in the area of sentence
bargaining. If a district court judge is only to accept a sentence bargain
if it falls within the Guidelines, it seems unlikely, if not impossible, that
the judge will be capable of making such a determination without having
viewed the PSI.
Nonetheless, the circuits are split on this issue. Some circuits hold
that a court must defer accepting a guilty plea until it has had an opportu-
nity to view the presentence report.133 Other circuits allow district judges
to accept guilty pleas as long as they state that their acceptance of the plea
is contingent upon their viewing the presentence report."' Still others
allow sentence bargaining to occur irrespective of the findings in the pre-
sentence report.3 5 It is some of these latter circuits that have created a
significant loophole in the Guidelines-one which effectively undermines
and bypasses the Guidelines by allowing sentence bargains to be ratified
regardless of the PSI's recommended sentence.
13 6
ITM. Problems with Implementation of the Guidelines
A. Continued Disparity
Even under the Guidelines, a great deal of unwarranted sentence
disparity continues to exist.'37 One study, which examined four districts,
ceptance or rejection until there has been an opportunity to consider the presentence report.'")
(emphasis in original).
132. See infra notes 226-38 and accompanying text.
133. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 979 F.2d 396, 398 n.2 (6th Cir. 1992) (stating
that the "Guidelines made acceptance of the plea agreement necessarily contingent upon the
preparation and consideration of the presentence report"); United States v. Ritsema, 89 F.3d
392, 397 (7th Cir. 1996) (stating that "section 6B1.1(c) of [the] Sentencing Guidelines elimi-
nates the authority of the court to accept a plea agreement immediately.").
134. See, e.g., United States v, Sanchez-Barretto, 93 F.3d 17, 24 (1st Cir. 1996), cert.
denied Arroyo-Reyes v. United States, 117 S.Ct 711 (1997); United States v. Fernandez, 877
F.2d 1138, 1143 (2d Cir. 1989); United States v. Ewing, 957 F.2d 115, 118 (4th Cir. 1992);
United States v. Puckett, 61 F.3d 1092, 1099 (4th Cir. 1995); United States v. Thomas, 894
F.2d 996, 997 (8th Cir. 1990); United States v. Rhodes, 913 F.2d 839, 843 (10th Cir. 1990).
135. These courts rely on the permissive language of Rule 11(e)(2) of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure. See infra notes 220-25 and accompanying text.
136. See infra notes 243-61 and accompanying text.
137. For a detailed discussion of this continuing problem, see Theresa Walker Karle &
Thomas Sager, Are the Federal Sentencing Guidelines Meeting Congressional Goals?: An Em-
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found alarming differences based on the various practices of prosecutors,
probation officers, and the mix of cases in each district.' Race also
continues to play a definitive role in sentencing, even though the Guide-
lines profess to be color-blind.'39 During 1989, when some offenders
were sentenced under pre-Guidelines law and some were sentenced under
the newly promulgated Guidelines, the effects on different racial groups
were studied. The results were alarming:
Whites, as a percentage of total offenders sentenced, dropped from
66.3% under pre-[G]uidelines law to only 44.5% under the
[G]uidelines. Blacks accounted for 26.2% of [G]uidelines sentences,
compared to 22.3% of pre-[G]uidelines sentences. Hispanics experi-
enced the most dramatic disparity; the percentage of offenders sen-
tenced under the [G]uidelines who were Hispanic was more than three
times the percentage sentenced pre-[G]luidelines-26.3% versus
8.5%.' 40
Finally, the existence of the substantial assistance departures'41 also
seems to allow for continued disparity under the Guidelines. Because of
these departures, a serious offender who cooperates with the Government
may receive a sentence that is significantly less than that received by a
codefendant whose role in the offense was relatively minor. 42 This is
due to the fact that the minor offender does not possess the type of infor-
mation that the Government deems valuable in pursuing other investiga-
tions or prosecutions."'3 For example, the head of a drug ring, who co-
operates with the Government, could receive a sentence below the
statutory minimum.'" His codefendant, who acted as a mere courier,
could receive a heavier sentence because his knowledge of the drug ring
is less valuable to the Government.14
pirical and Case Law Analysis, 40 EMORY L.J. 393 (1991) (finding that disparity continues to
exist under the Sentencing Guidelines).
138. Gerald W. Heaney, The Reality of Guidelines Sentencing: No End To Disparity, 28
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 161, 202 (1991).
139. 28 U.S.C. § 994(d) (1994 & Supp. 1996) ("The Commission shall assure that the
[G]uidelines and policy statements are entirely neutral as to the race, sex, national origin,
creed, and socioeconomic status of offenders.").
140. Heaney, supra note 138, at 204.
141. See supra notes 109-119 and accompanying text.
142. Antoinette Marie Tease, Downward Departures For Substantial Assistance: A Pro-
posal For Reducing Sentencing Disparities Among Codefendants, 53 MONT. L. REv. 75, 75
(1992).
143. Id. at 75.
144. Id.; see also GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 8, § 5K1.1, Comment. (n.1).
145. Tease, supra note 142, at 75.
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All this indicates that the Guidelines have failed, at least to some
extent, to accomplish one of their main goals: uniformity. One com-
mentator aptly recognized the difficulty of achieving total uniformity in a
criminal system."' In reacting to the findings of the above survey, he
stated:
Certainly the present study has not revealed a pattern of arbitrary action
by any judge or any district court. The simple point is that these
[G]uidelines have not eliminated "disparities" and that no set of guide-
lines, no matter how faithfully applied, can do so, so long as human
beings-law enforcement agents, prosecutors, probation officers, and
judges-must make the decisions affecting the liberty of other human
beings.
147
B. Reduced Judicial Discretion, Increased Prosecutorial Discretion
Because Congress eliminated parole, and severely limited the
amount of sentencing discretion accorded to federal judges, prosecutorial
discretion has been dramatically increased under the Guidelines. Sen-
tences are set "uniformly" and "predictably" on the basis of offense and
criminal history categories. 148 In many instances, the prosecutors' meth-
ods of charging and negotiating determine these offense and criminal
history categories. While the Commission hoped that the Guidelines
would help judges to tailor sentences to particular offenses, in practice it
has become the prosecutor who has been able to tailor the supposed of-
fense to the desired sentence. 
149
Because the probation officer is responsible for ensuring an impartial
and honest reporting of the facts in the PSI, he theoretically should play
an important role in checking the discretionary power of the prosecutor.
The realities of the system suggest, however, that the probation officer's
reporting is constrained by-and limited to-the information given to him
by the prosecutor. In many instances, he receives no information other
than that contained in the prosecutor's files.15 Additionally, even if the
PSI does contain an objective accounting of the circumstances of the of-
fense(s), there are some courts which do not require that the court view
146. Heaney, supra note 138, at 202.
147. Id. at 202-03.
148. Schulhofer & Nagel, supra note 112, at 238.
149. See id.
150. Parsons, supra note 22, at 450-51.
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the PSI before sentencing the defendant."' Due to these realities, the
very disparity that the Commission sought to erase remains a real danger.
Many scholars and judges have criticized the effects that the Guide-
lines have had on judicial and prosecutorial discretion. 52 Judge Wein-
stein,'53 from the Eastern District of New York, indicated as much when
he wrote:
We may not turn our backs on discretion. Though lulled by the ease
and seeming certainty of [Gluideline dictation, we must still listen for
the voice of the individual defendant, struggling to be heard amidst the
cacophony clamoring for a crackdown on crime and increased incar-
ceration. It is simply not possible for judges to rigidly apply a general,
two-dimensional set of sentencing standards to each individual case in a
just and beneficial manner, particularly when those standards callously
mandate incarceration across the board no matter how costly or de-
structive the result.1
54
In seeming agreement, another commentator gave her impressions of
the state of the Guidelines:
The [S]entencing [G]uidelines are an unmitigated disaster. In the past
four and a half years, seven versions of the [G]uidelines have been
published, with 434 amendments .... The circuits have developed
splits in many areas. Keeping current or even reasonably educated is a
nightmare. Disparity has increased under the [G]uidelines. Under the
pre-[G]uidelines regime, the sentence a client could expect depended in
large part on which judge she had. With the [G]uidelines, it depends on
which prosecutor, which probation officer, which judge and which cir-
cuit. 1
55
These criticisms reflect the dissatisfaction among judges with regard
to the fact that they no longer have "unfettered discretion to prescribe a
sentence outside of a statute or the Guidelines. "1 6 This limitation has
had a particularly significant effect on the current practice of plea bar-
gaining.
151. See supra notes 133-135 and accompanying text.
152. Parsons, supra note 22, at 422-23.
153. Judge Weinstein, a noted critic of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, is one of the
judges who currently allows prosecutors and defense counsel to enter into sentence bargains that
fall outside of the applicable Guideline ranges. See infra notes 239-243 and accompanying text.
Two articles written by Judge Weinstein give helpful insights as to his views on the Guidelines.
See generally Weinstein, supra note 37; Weinstein, supra note 1.
154. Weinstein, supra note 37, at 30.
155. Judy Clark, Comment, Sentencing and the War on Drugs, Conference on the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines: Summary of Proceedings, 101 YALE L.J., 2053, 2059 (1992).
156. Parsons, supra note 22, at 423.
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IV. Plea Bargaining
The Guidelines recognized the importance and validity of plea bar-
gaining."5 7 The Commission stated its intention not to "make major
changes in [Pre-Guidelines] plea agreement practices," because signifi-
cant changes in the plea bargaining system could, consequently, "make
the federal system unmanageable."158 In practice, however, the Guide-
lines have made a significant impact on plea bargaining. Currently, there
is conflict among circuits as to what the practice entails.159
This section explores the history of plea bargaining, the various
types of plea bargaining that occur under the Guidelines, and the effects
that the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and the Guidelines' policy
statements have had on the practice of plea bargaining. In very signifi-
cant ways, these Federal Rules and policy statements give unclear-in-
deed contradictory-guidance to the courts. It is because of this ambigu-
ity that exists between the Rules and the policy statements that some
courts have begun to allow prosecutors to negotiate plea bargains that fall
outside of the Guidelines.
A. Justifications and Criticisms
Throughout history, scholars have debated over the advantages and
disadvantages of a system which tolerates, and indeed encourages, plea
bargaining.' 60 This Part will briefly discuss the main arguments put forth
by both the proponents and opponents of plea bargaining.
(1) Proponents of Plea Bargaining
Plea bargaining is an integral part of our criminal justice system;
approximately ninety percent of all federal criminal sentences involve
157. See United States v. Aguilar, 884 F. Supp. 88, 90 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (quoting
GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 8, at ch. 1, pt. A, Intro. 4(c)); see also Breyer, supra note
24, at 31 (stating that the Commission intended to leave the practice of plea bargaining "where
it found it"); United States v. LeMay, 952 F.2d 995, 997 (8th Cir. 1991) (stating that the
"Guidelines were not intended to 'make major changes in plea agreement practices'") (quoting
GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 8, at ch. 1, pt. A, Intro. 4(c)).
158. Aguilar, 884 F. Supp. at 90 (quoting GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 8, at ch. 1,
pt. A, Intro. 4(c)).
159. See infra notes 243-275 and accompanying text.
160. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971) ("Properly administered,
[plea bargaining] is to be encouraged.").
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plea bargaining.161 In Brady v. United States, the Supreme Court recog-
nized that a "mutuality of advantage" exists under a system which allows
for plea bargaining. 2 In so recognizing, the Brady Court stated:
[That the prevalence of guilty pleas is explainable does not necessarily
validate those pleas or the system which produces them. But we cannot
hold that it is unconstitutional for the State to extend a benefit to a de-
fendant who in turn extends a substantial benefit to the State and who
demonstrates by his plea that he is ready and willing to admit his crime
and to enter the correctional system in a frame of mind that affords
hope for success in rehabilitation over a shorter period of time than
might otherwise be necessary.163
Proponents assert the mutual advantages of plea bargaining are ex-
tended to defendants, prosecutors, defense attorneys, judges, victims, and
the public. The "irrepressible tendency toward cooperation among" all
members of the courtroom has kept plea bargaining an essential part of
our criminal justice system."4
"Plea bargaining allows defendants, in exchange for the surrender of
certain constitutional rights, to gain prompt and final dispositions of their
cases, 'avoid the anxieties and uncertainties of a trial,' and escape the
maximum penalties authorized by law."" Prosecutors can obtain con-
victions while effectively avoiding expensive, risky, and time-consuming
trials. ' 6 Defense counsel, on the other hand, have a similar opportunity
to dispose of cases efficiently and reduce their overwhelming caseloads
through the process of plea bargaining. 67
Judges also benefit from the plea bargaining process, because they
can maintain a manageable docket and conserve "vital and scarce re-
sources." 68 "Victims may benefit by avoiding the rigors of a trial and by
not having to relive the horrors of their victimization in the presence of
the defendant and the public."1 69 Finally, the "public is protected from
161. Roland Acevedo, Note, Is a Ban on Plea Bargaining an Ethical Abuse of Discretion?
A Bronx County, New York Case Study, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 987 (1995).
162. 397 U.S. 742, 752 (1970).
163. Id. at 752-53.
164. Robert A. Weninger, The Abolition of Plea Bargaining: A Case Study of El Paso
County, Texas, 35 UCLA L. REV. 265, 266-67 (1987).
165. See Acevedo, supra note 161, at 991-92.
166. See David Yellen, Probation Officers Look at Plea Bargaining, And Do Not Like What
They See, 8 FED. SENT. REP. 339, 340 (1996).
167. See Acevedo, supra note 161, at 992.
168. Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71 (1977).
169. Acevedo, supra note 161, at 992.
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the risks posed by defendants who are free on bail while awaiting com-
pletion of the[ir] criminal proceedings."170
(2) Opponents of Plea Bargaining
Although proponents of plea bargaining point to the above advan-
tages, opponents argue that the costs of plea bargaining outweigh any
perceived benefits. 7 Some commentators point out that a large portion
of the public feels that a regular practice of plea bargaining is too lenient
on criminals. 1" Additionally, victims frequently feel as though the
criminal justice system has foiled them in instances where the offender
benefits from a dismissed case. 73 Furthermore, to refute the argument
that plea bargaining is necessary to preserve precious judicial resources,
one commentator has pointed to the fact that "'jurisdictions abroad [are
able to] resolve their criminal cases without plea bargaining', even
though these nations are 'far poorer' and have less judicial resources than
the United States." 1 74
Perhaps the most significant opposition to plea bargaining stems
from its inherently secretive nature. Absolute secrecy during the negoti-
ating process can affect the public's right to truth in sentencing.17 While
open trials allow the public to observe and participate in the legal proc-
ess, the secretive nature of plea bargaining removes this needed check on
prosecutorial misconduct and Government oppression. 76 Finally, there is
the argument that plea bargaining is coercive by nature, and its use in-
170. Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. at 71.
171. See generally Albert W. Alschuler, Implementing the Criminal Defendant's Right to
Trial: Alternatives to the Plea Bargaining System, 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 931, 931-34 (1983);
Albert W. Alschuler, The Changing Plea-Bargaining Debate, 69 CAL. L. REv. 652 (1981);
Albert W. Alschuler, Plea Bargaining and Its History, 79 COLUM. L. REv. 1 (1979); Albert
W. Alschuler, The Defense Attorney's Role In Plea Bargaining, 84 YALE L.J. 1179 (1975);
Albert W. Alschuler, The Prosecutor's Role In Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 50
(1968).
172. See Acevedo, supra note 161, at 992.
173. David A. Starkweather, Note, The Retributive Theory of "Just Deserts" and Victim
Participation in Plea Bargaining, 67 IND. L.J. 853, 853 (1992).
174. Breyer, supra note 24, at 29 n.136 (quoting Albert Alschuler, Sentencing Reform and
Prosecutorial Power: A Critique of Recent Proposals for 'Fixed' and 'Presumptive' Sentencing,
126 U. PA. L. REV. 550, 565 (1978).
175. Wilkins, supra note 16, at 186.
176. Acevedo, supra note 161, at 993.
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duces many defendants, who are factually guilty, to plead guilty even
though they may be legally innocent." 7
B. Different Types of Bargaining Under the Guidelines
This Section examines the various forms of plea bargaining that take
place under the Sentencing Guidelines.
(1) Implicit Bargaining
Implicit bargaining refers to the judicial practice of sentencing de-
fendants who plead guilty more leniently than those who choose to go to
trial.17 In fact, judges implicitly bargain without negotiating with any-
one.' 79 Federal judges appear to sentence defendants less severely if they
plead guilty, suggesting that implicit bargaining has had a more signifi-
cant impact on federal sentencing than the traditional plea bargaining that
occurs between prosecutors and defense counsel.'
The Guidelines have sought to reduce the effect that implicit bar-
gaining has had on sentencing.1 ' While the Guidelines do allow for an
adjustment under acceptance of responsibility, they limit the amount of
the reduction to two or three offense levels." The "acceptance of re-
sponsibility" discount under the Guidelines is generally less significant
than the discounts provided to defendants that pleaded guilty prior to the
Guidelines. 183
(2) Charge Bargaining
Charge bargaining is covered by Rule 11(e)(1)(A) of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure"' and policy statement § 6B1.2(a) of the
Guidelines.)' It entails the practice, by prosecutors, of entering into an
agreement with the defendant whereby the prosecutor agrees to drop
177. Peter Arenella, Project, Rethinking the Functions of Criminal Procedure: The Warren
and Burger Courts' Competing Ideologies, 72 GEO. L.J. 185, 211 (1983).
178. Albert W. Alschuler, Departures and Plea Agreements Under the Sentencing Guide-




182. See supra notes 98-108 and accompanying text.
183. Alschuler, supra note 178, at 471.
184. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(e)(1)(A).
185. See GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 8, § 6B1.2(a).
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certain charges in return for the defendant pleading guilty to others.186
For example, if a defendant had committed three counts of assault, the
prosecutor might agree to drop two of the counts if the defendant agreed
to plead guilty to one of them. This would be to the defendant's advan-
tage, because the applicable Guideline range for one count of assault
would be significantly less than the range for three counts of assault. 7
The Guidelines limit the practice of charge bargaining in two im-
portant ways. First, the Guidelines allow a district court judge to deter-
mine the applicable sentencing range by relying on conduct outside the
count of conviction if the offense: 1) is based primarily on quantity or
amount (drugs, theft, embezzlement, etc.),188 and 2) involves conduct that
is part of a common scheme or plan."8 9 So, for example, in a drug case
involving five counts of dealing heroin (occurring under a common
scheme or plan), the offense level would be determined by the amount of
drugs involved, not by the number of counts charged. Therefore, even if
the prosecution were to agree to drop four of the counts, the offense level
(and therefore the Guideline range) would be unaffected. 'I
Second, under policy statement § 6B1.2(a), the Guidelines state that
a judge may accept a "charge" plea bargain only if "the court deter-
mines... that the remaining charges adequately reflect the seriousness
of the actual offense behavior and that accepting the agreement will not
undermine the statutory purposes of sentencing or the [S]entencing
[G]uidelines." 19' This gives the.judge the authority to reject the plea bar-
gain if she determines that the sentence resulting from the charged of-
fenses will not adequately reflect the seriousness of the actual offenses."9
For example, if a defendant committed armed bank robbery, and both the
prosecution and defense counsel agree only to charge simple theft, the
Guidelines would seemingly require the judge to reject the plea agree-
186. See Dawn Reddy, Guilty Pleas and Practice, 30 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1117, 1133
(1993).
187. See Donald A. Purdy, Jr., The Tempered Handshake, Plea Agreements Under the Fed-
eral Sentencing Guidelines, THE WASHINGTON LAWYER, Mar./Apr. 1989, at 30.
188. See GuIDELNES MANUAL, supra note 8, § 3D1.2(d).
189. See GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 8, § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B).
190. Donald A. Purdy, Jr. & Michael Goldsmith, Better Do Your Homework, Plea Bar-
gaining Under the New Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 3 CRIM. JuST. 2, 4 (1988).
191. GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 8, at § 6B1.2(a) (emphasis added).
192. The Guidelines state that a court must consider the presentence report before deciding
whether to accept or reject a Rule 11(e)(1)(A) charge bargain. Id. at § 6B1.1(c). Accordingly,
a judge may consider facts and circumstances not included in the actual charge plea bargain
when deciding whether to accept it.
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ment because the reduced charges would not reflect the seriousness of the
actual offense. 93 It is important to note that if a judge rejects a charge
agreement, the defendant has the opportunity of withdrawing the guilty
plea and going to trial."9
For the above two reasons, charge bargaining has become signifi-
cantly less desirable as a result of the Sentencing Guidelines. 9
(3) Nonbinding Sentence Recommendation Agreements
Nonbinding sentence recommendation agreements are governed by
Rule 1 1(e)(1)(B) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure"9 and policy
statement § 6B1.2(b) of the Guidelines."9 A sentence recommendation
agreement occurs when a prosecutor, in exchange for a guilty plea,
agrees either to recommend a particular sentence to the court or not to
oppose a sentence request made by the defendant.'98 A sentence recom-
mendation agreement is not binding on the court."9 Once a defendant
agrees to a Rule 11(e)(1)(B) recommendation agreement, he may not
withdraw his guilty plea, even if the judge rejects the agreement and im-
poses a heavier sentence."
193. See Nagel & Schulhofer, supra note 3, at 505.
194. See FED. R. CRIM. P. (11)(e)(4) ("If the court rejects the plea agreement, the court
shall... advise the defendant personally... that the court is not bound by the plea agree-
ment ... [and] afford the defendant the opportunity to then withdraw his plea . . .");
GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 8, § 6131.3 ("If a plea agreement pursuant to Rule
11(e)(1)(A) or Rule (11)(e)(1)(C) is rejected, the court shall afford the defendant an opportunity
to withdraw the defendant's guilty plea.").
195. See Reddy, supra note 186, at 1133.
196. See FED. R. CraM. P. l1(e)(1)(B) (stating that a prosecutor may agree with defense
council to "make a recommendation, or agree not to oppose the defendant's request, for a par-
ticular sentence, with the understanding that such recommendation or request shall not be bind-
ing upon the court").
197. See GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 8, § 6B1.2(b).
198. See FED. R. CRIM. P. I1(e)(1)(B).
199. See William L. Gardner & David S. Rildnd, A Basic Guide to Plea Bargaining Under
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 7 CRiM. JUST. 14, 16 (1992); FED. R. CRIM. P.
11(e)(1)(B).
200. See FED. R. CRiM. P. 11(e)(2) ("If the agreement is of the type specified in subdivi-
sion (e)(1)(B), the court shall advise the defendant that if the court does not accept the recom-
mendation or request the defendant nevertheless has no right to withdraw his plea.");
GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 8, § 6B1.1(b) ("If the plea agreement includes a nonbinding
recommendation pursuant to Rule Il(e)(1)(B), the court shall advise the defendant that the court
is not bound by the sentencing recommendation, and that the defendant has no right to withdraw
the defendant's guilty plea if the court decides not to accept the sentencing recommendation set
forth in the plea agreement.").
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(4) Fact Bargaining
Another manner in which bargaining attorneys may attempt to
"make the crime fit the punishment rather than the punishment fit the
crime" is by engaging in fact bargaining.m Policy statement § 6B1.4
(Stipulations) of the Guidelines, however, makes efforts to curtail this
practice.' Section 6B1.4 states that fact stipulation agreements must
contain all the facts and circumstances of the actual offense conduct, not
merely the facts and circumstances relating to the charged offenses.'
This is an important distinction, because if a judge finds facts in the
stipulation that indicate the offender committed a more serious offense
than that to which he pleaded, the judge must sentence that offender as if
he had committed the more serious offense.' 4
Additionally, a district court judge is not bound by fact stipulations;
during sentencing, she may rely on facts contained in the presentence re-
port that vary from those in the stipulation.' In these situations, the
probation officers who prepare the presentence reports have the opportu-
nity-and many argue the responsibility-to act as an important check on
the prosecutor's use of fact bargaining. 6
(5) Sentence Bargaining
Sentence bargaining is covered under Rule 11(e)(1)(C) of the Fed-
eral Rules of Criminal Procedure2 and policy statement § 6B1.2(c) of
201. Alschuler, supra note 178, at 473.
202. See GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 8, § 6B1.4. The Commentary to this section
states that the "stipulation must fully and accurately disclose all factors relevant to the determi-
nation of sentence." Id. at §6B1.4 Commentary.
203. See Gardner & Rifkind, supra note 199, at 16.
204. See GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 8, § 1B1.2(a) (stating that where a plea agree-
ment is accompanied by a fact stipulation that "specifically establishes a more serious offense
than the offense of conviction," a district court judge has to determine the offense level ac-
cording to the Guideline most applicable to the stipulated offense); See id. at § 1B1.2(c) ("A
plea agreement (written or made orally on the record) containing a stipulation that specifically
establishes the commission of additional offense(s) shall be treated as if the defendant had been
convicted of additional count(s) charging those offense(s).").
205. See id. at § 6B1.4(d) ("The court is not bound by the stipulation, but may with the aid
of the presentence report, determine the facts relevant to sentencing.").
206. See Yellen, supra note 166, at 340 (discussing the inherent conflict between prosecu-
tors and probation officers, because "[i]n their assigned role under the [Gluidelines, probation
officers often see themselves as guardians of the system's integrity. Their job is to apply the
[G]uidelines faithfully, and to do that they need access to all of the fact[s]").
207. See FED. R. CrIM. P. l1(e)(1)(C) (stating that a prosecutor may agree with defense
counsel that "a specific sentence is the appropriate disposition of the case").
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the Guidelines."' Under sentence bargaining, the prosecutor and defense
counsel either agree to a specific sentence, or agree that the defendant's
sentence will not exceed a certain number of months.' The court is not
obligated to accept any such agreement; it may "accept or reject the
[sentence] agreement, or may defer its decision as to the acceptance or
rejection until there has been an opportunity to consider the presentence
report. 211 If a judge rejects the sentence agreement, the defendant has
the opportunity of withdrawing the guilty plea and going to trial.21'
According to a survey of probation officers, instances of sentence
bargaining are rare.21 This is most likely due to the restrictions placed
upon sentence bargaining by policy statement § 6B1.2(c) of the Guide-
lines. Because of important contradictions between Rule 11(e) and the
Chapter Six Policy Statements in the Guidelines, however, some courts
have begun to allow sentence bargaining to occur even when it prescribes
sentences that fall outside of the applicable Guideline range.213
C. The Effect of the Guidelines on Plea Bargaining: Rule 11 and the
Guidelines Chapter Six Policy Statements
While opponents of plea bargaining tried to convince the Commis-
sion that the practice should be completely abolished, 24 the proponents
argued that plea bargaining was a necessary part of our criminal justice
system.2 5 In the end, the Commission endorsed plea bargaining and de-
208. GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 8, § 6B11.2(c) ("In the case of a plea agreement that
includes a specific sentence, [Rule ll(e)(1)(Q], the court may accept the agreement if the court
is satisfied either that: (1) the agreed sentence is within the applicable [G]uideline range; or (2)
the agreed sentence departs from the applicable [Gluideline range for justifiable reasons.").
209. See Wilkins, supra note 16, at 185-86.
210. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(e)(2).
211. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(e)(4) ("If the court rejects the plea agreement, the court
shall ... advise the defendant personally... that the court is not bound by the plea agree-
ment [and] afford the defendant the opportunity to then withdraw the plea ... ."); See
GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 8, § 6B1.3 ("If a plea agreement pursuant to Rule
11(e)(1)(A) or Rule (11)(e)(1)(C) is rejected, the court shall afford the defendant an opportunity
to withdraw the defendant's guilty plea.").
212. See Yellen, supra note 166, at 305 (showing that the frequencies of defendants being
convicted upon pleas of guilty entered into pursuant to specific sentences under Rule 11(e)(1)(C)
are rare).
213. See infra notes 243-61 and accompanying text.
214. See Breyer, supra note 24, at 29.
215. See id.
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cided "not to make major changes in plea agreement practices." 216 Spe-
cifically, the Commission wrote:
The Commission [has] decided not to make major changes in plea
agreement practices in the initial [G]uidelines, but rather to provide
guidance by issuing general policy statements concerning the acceptance
of plea agreements in Chapter Six, Part B (Plea Agreements). The
rules set forth in Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(e) govern the acceptance or re-
jection of such agreements. The Commission will collect data on the
courts' plea practices and will analyze this information to determine
when and why the courts accept or reject plea agreements and whether
plea agreement practices are undermining the intent of the Sentencing
Reform Act.
217
According to the Commission, then, Rule 11(e) of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure "govern[s] the acceptance or rejection of [plea]
agreements." 218 Chapter Six of the Guidelines, on the other hand, sets
forth guidance in the form of "general policy statements concerning the
acceptance of plea agreements."
219
(1) Rule 11(e)
Rule 1 l(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure authorizes
three types of plea bargaining: charge bargaining (Rule 11(e)(1)(A)), 0
nonbinding sentence recommendation agreements (Rule 11(e)(1)(B)),"
and binding sentence bargaining (Rule 1 l(e)(1)(C)).m
If the plea bargain is a charge bargain (11(e)(1)(A)) or a sentence
bargain (11(e)(1)(C)), Rule 11(e) states that the court has the option of
accepting the agreement, rejecting the agreement, or deferring its deci-
sion to accept or reject the agreement until it has had an opportunity to
view the presentence report.' If the court rejects a charge or sentence
agreement, the defendant must be given the opportunity to withdraw his
guilty plea.24
216. GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 8, ch. 1, pt. A., Intro. 4(c).
217. Id. (emphasis added).
218. Id.
219. Id. (emphasis added). -
220. See supra notes 184-95 and accompanying text.
221. See supra notes 196-200 and accompanying text.
222. See supra notes 207-12 and accompanying text.
223. See FED. R. CIM. P. 11(e)(2); see also United States v. Cunavelis, 969 F.2d 1419,
1422 (2d Cir. 1992).
224. See FED. R. CiuM. P. l1(e)(4).
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However, if the plea bargain is a nonbinding sentence recommenda-
tion agreement (1 l(e)(1)(B)), the defendant may not withdraw his plea of
guilty. This holds even in situations where the court decides to impose a
greater sentence than that which was suggested in the recommendation
agreement2z
(2) Chapter Six Policy Statements
The Guidelines cover the area of plea bargaining through several
policy statements issued pursuant to § 994(a)(2)(E).2 6 To a certain de-
gree, the policy statements track the procedural requirements of Rule 11
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 7 It is important to note,
however, that these policy statements are more than a mere reaffirmation
of the existence of Rule 11. They are intended to go further-to ensure
that plea negotiation practices do not undermine the purposes set forth
under the Guidelines. 9
Under policy statement § 6B1.2(a), a court may accept a charge
bargain plea agreement only if it first determines that the remaining
charges adequately reflect the seriousness of the offender's criminal con-
duct." Additionally, the court must determine "that accepting the
agreement will not undermine the statutory purposes of sentencing or the
[S]entencing [G]uidelines. " "
According to § 6B1.2(b) of the Guidelines, a court may only accept
a plea bargain involving a nonbinding sentence recommendation if the
recommendation is within the applicable Guideline range or departs for
justifiable reasons.3" Similarly, policy statement § 6B1.2(c) states that a
court may not accept a binding sentence agreement unless it is satisfied
225. See Cunavelis, 969 F.2d at 1422.
226. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(2)(E) (1994 & Supp. 1996) (stating that the Commission shall
promulgate general policy statements regarding the application of the Guidelines with regard to
"the authority granted under [R]ule 11(e)(2) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to ac-
cept or reject a plea agreement entered into pursuant to [R]ule 11(e)(1)") (emphasis added).
227. See Wilkins, supra note 16, at 189; see generally GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 8,
§§ 6B1.1-6B1.4.
228. Wilkins, supra note 16, at 189.
229. GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 8, § 6B Intro. Comment; 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
(1994 & Supp. 1996).
230. GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 8, § 6B1.2(a); Wilkins, supra note 16, at 189.
231. GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 8, § 6B1.2(a).
232. GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 8, § 6B1.2(b); Wilkins, supra note 16, at 189.
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that the sentence is within the applicable Guideline range or departs for
justifiable reasons. 3
(3) Conflicts Between Rule 11 and the Policy Statements
A careful reading of the Guidelines' policy statements and Rule
11(e) reveals that the mandatory language of the policy statements con-
tradicts the permissive language of Rule 11(e). 4  Because of this con-
flict, courts have interpreted the applicability of Rule 11(e) and the
Chapter Six Policy Statements in different ways.
Some courts hold-pursuant to Rule 11(e)-that a court may accept
or reject a plea agreement when it is presented, or defer its decision until
it has had an opportunity to view the presentence report.?5 These courts
interpret Rule 11(e) to give them the authority to accept a plea agreement
regardless of whether the proposed sentence falls outside of the applica-
ble Guideline range. 6  This interpretation is commonly justified by
pointing to the fact that the Guidelines explicitly state that Rule 11(e)-
and only Rule 11(e)-governs the acceptance or rejection of plea agree-
ments. 7  This interpretation is also justified by the language in 28
U.S.C. § 994(a)(2)(E), which states the Commission's intention of defer-
ring to "the authority granted under [R]ule 11(e)(2) of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure to accept or reject a plea agreement entered into
pursuant to [R]ule 11(e)(1)."" 8
Not all courts agree with the above interpretation. In fact, other ju-
risdictions give controlling weight to the Chapter Six Policy State-
ments. 9 These courts hold that a plea bargain may only be accepted by
the court if the recommended sentence is within the applicable Guideline
range or departs from the Guideline range for "justifiable reasons." 2I In
support of this interpretation, proponents rely on the Congressional intent
233. GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 8, § 6B1.2(c); Wilkins, supra note 16, at 189.
234. Unites States v. Ruch, 906 F. Supp. 261, 263 (E.D. Pa. 1995).
235. FED. R. CaIM. P. l1(e)(2); see supra notes 133-35 and accompanying text.
236. See infra notes 243-61 and accompanying text.
237. GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 8, ch. 1, pt. A, Intro. 4(c); see infra notes 243-61
and accompanying text.
238. 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(2)(E) (1994 & Supp. 1996).
239. See infra notes 262-75 and accompanying text.
240. See GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 8, §§ 6B1.2(b)-6B1.2(c). The Commentary to
§ 6B1.2 further defines "justifiable reasons" as departures that are authorized by 18 U.S.C. §
3553(b) (1994 & Supp. 1996). GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 8, § 6B1.2 Comment.
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found in the policy statements. This Congressional intent appears in the
qualifying language of the Chapter Six Policy Statements which states:
Policy statements governing the acceptance of plea agreements under
Rule 11(e)(1), [Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure], are intended to
ensure that plea negotiation practices: (1) promote the statutory pur-
poses of sentencing prescribed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a); and (2) do not
perpetuate unwarranted sentencing disparity. These policy statements
are a first step toward implementing 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(2)(E). Con-
gress indicated that it expects judges "to examine plea agreements to
make certain that prosecutors have not used plea bargaining to under-
mine the [S]entencing [G]uidelines."241
While it seems, then, that the Congressional intent is clear, the de-
bate remains as to how much weight to assign to these policy statements
if they conflict with Rule 11 (e).
V. The Effect of the Conflict Between Rule 11(e) and the
Policy Statements on the Practice of Sentence Bargaining
The ambiguity that exists between the policy statements and Rule
11(e) has given some courts the opportunity to create a significant loop-
hole in the Guidelines. These courts, maintaining that only Rule 11(e)
governs the practice of plea bargaining,242 have sanctioned sentence bar-
gains that fall outside of the applicable Guideline range. While the
Chapter Six Policy Statements clearly prohibit such practice, there re-
mains debate as to whether these policy statements have controlling
weight; courts that allow this practice simply maintain that the policy
statements are not binding on the court.
A. Jurisdictions Allowing Rule 11(e)(1)(C) Sentence Bargains to Fall
Outside of the Guidelines
In United States v. Aguilar,243 the district court concluded that par-
ties may enter into a Rule 11(e)(1)(C) sentence agreement even if the
sentence falls outside of the applicable Guideline range and is not sup-
ported by a valid departure rationale.2' In Aguilar, the Guidelines range
set forth in the presentence report recommended a sentence of 360
months to life; nonetheless, the court accepted a specific sentence bargain
241. Id. at § 6B1.1, Intro. Comment (quoting S. Rep. No. 98-225, at 167 (1983)).
242. See infra notes 243-61 and accompanying text.
243. 884 F. Supp. 88 (E.D.N.Y. 1995)
244. See id. at 90-92.
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of 188 months.245 Although the Aguilar court recognized that policy
statement § 6B1.2(c) requires the agreed-upon sentence to be within the
Guidelines, it maintained that Rule 11(e) did not require such a result.
246
The court further buttressed its argument by pointing to the fact that
while Rule 11(c) was amended in 1989 to refer to the Guidelines, Rule
11(e) makes no such reference to the Guidelines.247 Accordingly, the
judge found that § 6B1.2(c) was not binding on the court.248
Similarly, in United States v. Cunavelis,24 9 the court held that a
judge may accept a sentence agreement even though it may fall outside of
the applicable Guideline range. 50 Important in its analysis was the fact
that Rule 11 "plainly contemplated" that sentence agreements-in con-
trast to the nature of nonbinding sentence recommendations-were to be
"binding on the district court.""1 The court concluded that a district
judge may accept or reject a specific sentence agreement if it falls outside
of the Guidelines, but she may not modify it.5 2 Other courts have held in
accord."
In United States v. Ruch, 4 the court directly addressed the issue of
whether the Chapter Six Policy Statements should be binding on the
245. See id. at 89. No reasons for departure were offered by the court. Id.
246. See id. at 90 ("In reaching the decision to permit sentence bargaining outside the
Guidelines, the Commission explicitly rejected the argument that '[Gluidelines that failed to
control and limit plea agreements would leave untouched a 'loophole' large enough to undo the
good that [S]entencing [Gluidelines would bring.'") (citing GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note
8, ch. 1, pt. A, Intro. 4(c)).
247. See Aguilar, 884 F. Supp. at 90-91.
248. See id.
249. 969 F.2d 1419.
250. See id. at 1422.
251. Id. at 1422. The court referred to the language of Rule 11 which states that "[i]f the
agreement is of the type specified in subdivision (e)(1)(A) or (C), the court may accept or reject
the agreement .... If the court accepts the plea agreement, the court shall inform the defen-
dant that it will embody in the judgment and sentence the disposition proided for in the plea
agreement." Id. at 1422 (emphasis added); accord United States v. Braimah, 3 F.3d 609, 611
(2d Cir. 1993) (approving "'sentence' plea agreements pursuant to [Rule] 11(e)(1)(C), under
which a defendant effectively waives his right to a downward departure").
252. See Cunavelis, 969 F.2d at 1422.
253. See, e.g., U.S. v. Kaye, 65 F.3d 240, 243 n.3 (2d Cir. 1995) ("We have held that a
court may 'accept or reject... [but] may not modify' an agreement calling for a specific sen-
tence, even if the sentence does not comport with the Guidelines.") (citing Cunavelis, 969 F.2d
at 1422); United States v. Barnes, 83 F.3d 934, 941 (7th Cir. 1996) ("Plea agreements can re-
tain their authority to bind the [Giovernment, the defendant and the district court even when
they provide for sentences that depart from the prescriptions of the [Gluldelines.").
254. 906 F. Supp. 261.
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courts.255 The Ruch court acknowledged that "[t]he [G]uidelines as well
as '[t]he policy statements and commentary contained in the [Gluidelines
are binding on the federal courts. "256 However, it went on to state that
when a Guideline, or the Commission's interpretation of a Guideline,
conflicts with a statute, the statute "obviously must be given 'controlling
weight."' 257 The Ruch court concluded that since the Commission itself
acknowledged "that Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
takes precedence over Chapter [Six] of the [G]uidelines," Rule 11 there-
fore "trumps" the Chapter Six Policy Statements. 25 8
Since the actual Guidelines-as opposed to general policy state-
ments-offer no guidance regarding the acceptance or rejection of plea
bargains, the Ruch court is not alone in its analysis of Rule 11.2' One
commentator aptly described the conflict as follows:
Policy statements are substantially different from [G]uidelines. Guide-
lines, under the statutory scheme, are intended to be specific in nature
and mandatory in application. Policy statements, on the other hand, are
intended by Congress to provide general guidance on a variety of con-
cerns involved in the sentencing process. A sentence imposed that is
inconsistent with the guidelines is subject to appellate review, while one
that is only inconsistent with the policy statements is not.
260
It is the ambiguity between Rule 11(e) and the Guidelines' policy
statements that has allowed these courts to accept sentence bargains al-
though they seemingly undermine the purposes set forth in the Guide-
lines.
261
255. See id. at 263.
256. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Holifield, 53 F.3d 11, 13 n.2 (3d Cir.
1995)); see also United States v. Davis, 53 F.3d 638, 640 n.6 (4th Cir. 1995) (finding a Chap-
ter Seven policy statement similarly non-binding because there are no actual Guidelines in
Chapter Seven for it to interpret).
257. Ruch, 906 F. Supp. at 263 (quoting Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 45 (1993)).
258. Ruch, 906 F. Supp. at 263-64.
259. See United States v. Enquist, 745 F. Supp. 541, 543 n.3 (N.D. Ind. 1990) ("Because
§ 6B1.2 is a policy statement rather than a [Gluideline, it is uncertain whether it should be read
to have preclusive effect in any case." (emphasis added)).
260. Wilkins, supra note 16, at 187 (citing S. REP. No. 98-225, at 165-68 (1983), re-
printed in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3348-3351). The report stated that "[t]his is not intended
to undermine the value of the policy statements. It is, instead, a recognition that the policy
statements may be more general in nature than the [G]uidelines and thus more difficult to use in
determining the right to appellate review." Id. at 3350.
261. For a contrary argument, that sentence agreements do not substantially undermine the
mission of the Guidelines, see John Gleeson, Sentence Bargaining Under the Guidelines, FED.
SENT. REP., May/June 1996, at 314 (arguing that the Guidelines, "which are confusing on this
issue, should be amended to explicitly authorize such agreements").
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B. Jurisdictions Refusing to Allow Rule 11(e)(1)(C) Sentence Bargains to
Fall Outside of the Guidelines
Not all courts interpret the permissive nature of Rule 11(e) to allow
courts to accept sentence bargains even though they fall outside of the
Guidelines. These courts give controlling weight to the Chapter Six Pol-
icy Statements, because they clearly indicate that Congress wanted to
prevent prosecutors and judges from using plea bargaining to undermine
the purposes of the Sentencing Guidelines.262
In United States v. Carrozza, 3 for example, the court held that the
district court judge had committed error when he accepted a sentence
bargain that fell outside of the applicable Guideline range.2' In so hold-
ing, the court found that policy statement § 6B1.2(c)2" was binding on
the district court judge.26 Therefore, the Carrozza court concluded that,
before a district court may accept a specific sentence agreement, the
judge must first be satisfied that: "(1)the agreed sentence is within the
applicable [G]uideline range; or (2)the agreed sentence departs from the
applicable [G]uideline range for justifiable reasons."267
The Sixth Circuit similarly gives controlling weight to the Chapter
Six Policy Statements over Rule 11(e). In both United States v. Kern-
pei'6 and Fields v. United States,269 the Sixth Circuit held that a district
court may only accept a specific sentence agreement if it is satisfied that
the agreed upon sentence is within the applicable [G]uideline range.27
The Sixth Circuit explicitly stated that "'only if the court is satis-
fied... that the contemplated sentence is within the [G]uidelines' can it
262. GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 8, § 6B1.1, Intro. Comment.
263. United States v. Carrozza, 4 F.3d 70 (1st Cir. 1993).
264. See id. at 87.
265. GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 8, § 6B1.2(c).
266. See Carrozza, 4 F.3d at 87.
267. Id. (quoting GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 8, § 6131.2).
268. 908 F.2d 33 (6th Cir. 1990).
269. 963 F.2d 105 (6th Cir. 1992).
270. See Kemper, 908 F.2d at 36; Fields, 963 F.2d at 108.
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accept an agreement requiring imposition of a specific sentence"."27 The
Fifth Circuit is also in agreement with this interpretation.2'
Even the Justice Department discourages its prosecutors from nego-
tiating sentence agreements that fall outside of the Guidelines. In the
Prosecutor's Handbook on Sentencing Guidelines (also known as the
"Redbook"), the Justice Department emphasizes that "[t]he overriding
principle governing the conduct of plea negotiations is that plea agree-
ments should not be used to circumvent the Guidelines." 2' The Redbook
goes on to state that "prosecutors should not recommend or agree to a
lower-than-[G]uideline sentence merely on the basis of a plea agree-
ment."274 Given these statements, it is clear that the Justice Department
chose "to side with the Commission and Congress in urging openness,
uniformity and deference to [the Sentencing Guidelines]."'275
C. The Correct Interpretation of Rule 11(e) and the Policy Statements
This split over the practice of sentence bargaining represents a sig-
nificant problem. If it becomes apparent to prosecutors that "sentence
bargains... can potentially be used to completely bypass the
[G]uidelines,'276 there is a real danger that this controversy may promote
the very inter-circuit disparity that the Guidelines have sought to elimi-
nate. 2 7 This Section explains why courts should be prohibited from ac-
cepting sentence agreements that deviate from the Guidelines.
271. Fields, 963 F.2d at 108 (quoting Kemper, 908 F.2d at 36-37). The Fields court also
stated that "[a] sentencing judge [can] no longer be forced to abide by an agreed to sentence
where that sentence [does] not conform to the Guidelines, as that would eviscerate their pur-
pose." Fields, 963 F.2d at 108.
272. See United States v. Foy, 28 F.3d 464, 471 (5th Cir. 1994) (stating that the Guidelines
make "a district court's acceptance of a guilty plea contingent upon the court's review of the
[presentence report]").
273. Edward M. Shaw, Outside Counsel, Plea Bargaining White-Collar Offenses Under
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, N.Y. L.J., May 25, 1990, at 7 (quoting U.S. DEP'T OF JUST.,
PROSECUTOR'S HANDBOOK ON SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND OTHER PROVISIONS OF THE
SENTENCING REFORM ACT OF 1984, at 48 (1987) [hereinafter PROSECUTOR'S HANDBOOK]).
274. Terry Philip Segal, Plea Bargaining Under the New Federal Sentencing Guidelines,
BOSTON BAR J., Mar./Apr. 1988, at 19 (quoting PROSECUTOR'S HANDBOOK at 43).
275. Schulhofer & Nagel, supra note 112, at 252.
276. Yellen, supra note 166, at 340 (citing U.S. v. Aguilar, 884 F. Supp 88 (E.D.N.Y.
1995)).
277. This practice may represent a significant loophole because of the insulation of Rule
11(e)(1)(C) agreements from appellate review. The appellate review of a sentence is governed
by 18 U.S.C. § 3742, which states that a defendant may appeal a sentence if it is imposed for
an offense for which a Sentencing Guideline has been issued and the sentence is "greater than
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(1) The Permissive Language of Rule 11(e) Should Not Control
Although some courts point to the fact that Chapter Six contains only
general policy statements, and therefore is not binding, they seemingly
fail to acknowledge the existence of a statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c).27
This statute clearly states that a district judge "shall state in open court"
the reason for imposing a sentence at a particular point within the Guide-
line range or, if the sentence is outside of the range, the specific reason
for the imposition of a sentence different from that described; it makes no
exceptions for plea agreements.279 Like the Chapter Six Policy State-
ments, this language represents an important limitation on Rule 11(e).
Unlike the Chapter Six Policy Statements, though, this language is con-
tained in a statute, so its existence cannot be minimized or explained
away in the same manner. 21'
(2) A Court's "Sense of Justice" Is Not a Valid Reason for Sentencing Outside of
a Guideline Range
In Aguilar, Judge Weinstein justified his acceptance of a sentence
bargain that fell outside of the Guideline range by explaining:
Had the court been required to impose the Guidelines sentence, the de-
fendant would have been imprisoned for 30 years-far longer than re-
quired for deterrence or any other rational justification for punish-
ment-at great expense to the taxpayers. Moreover, the system would
have been deprived of the benefits of negotiations that resulted in the
acceptance of twelve guilty pleas at one time. Thus, substantively and
the sentence specified in the applicable [G]uideline" and "greater than the sentence set forth in
[a plea] agreement" under Rule 11(e)(1)(C) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 18
U.S.C. § 3742 (1994 & Supp. 1996). Similarly, the Government may appeal a sentence if it is
imposed for an offense for which a Sentencing Guideline has been issued and the sentence is
"less than the sentence specified in the applicable [G]uideline" and "less than the sentence set
forth in [a plea] agreement" under Rule(e)(1)(C) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure."
Id. However, the statute noticeably omits any reference to situations where the sentence is im-
posed, pursuant to a plea agreement, which falls outside of any applicable Guideline range, and
neither the defendant nor the Government wish to appeal the sentence.
278. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c) (1994 & Supp. 1996); see supra note 90 and accompanying text.
279. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c).
280. The restrictive departure language of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1994 & Supp. 1996) is
similarly at odds with a permissive interpretation of FED. R. CPlM. P. 11(e)(1)(C). It clearly
states that to depart from the Guidelines, there must exist "an aggravating or mitigating circum-
stance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing
Commission in formulating the [G]uidelines that should result in a sentence different from that
described." 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b). See supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text.
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procedurally, the agreement produced a more acceptable result than
would have resulted from adherence to the Guidelines. 28
Therefore, it would seem that through his own sense of justice,
Judge Weinstein felt that he reached the "right" decision. However, this
is a totally unacceptable reason for sentencing outside of a Guideline
range. In fact, these differing definitions of "justice" among circuits led
to the promulgation of the Guidelines in the first place. Recently, in
Koon v. United States,' the Supreme Court addressed this very issue.
In Koon, the Court concluded that it was improper for a court to depart
from an applicable Guideline range simply because its own sense of jus-
tice would call for it.
83
(3) The Guidelines Contain Adequate Inducements For Defendants to Plead
Guilty Without Having to Go Outside of the Guidelines
Those in favor of allowing prosecutors to enter into binding sentence
agreements outside of the Guidelines argue that "if plea bargains could
not alter sentences, defendants would have little interest in bargaining.
Therefore, the logic goes, in order to keep plea bargaining as a valid part
of the system, Rule 11(e) should be read to allow prosecutors to cut deals
outside of the Guidelines.
This argument fails, however, because under the current Guidelines,
plea bargains can-and do-alter defendants' sentences. Accordingly,
defendants still have an interest in bargaining.' The Commission, em-
powered by Congress, considered this issue and saw fit to provide three
types of inducements for defendants to plea bargain: by providing a
twenty-five percent spread within most Guideline ranges;. 6 by allowing
for acceptance of responsibility adjustments;8 7 and by enabling courts to
depart based upon substantial assistance.88 Many courts do not feel that
281. Aguilar, 884 F. Supp. at 92.
282. Koon v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 2035 (1996).
283. See id. at 2046 ("Before a departure is permitted, certain aspects of the case must be
found unusual enough for it to fall outside the heartland of cases in the Guideline.").
284. United States v. Stanley, 928 F.2d 575, 582 (2d Cir. 1991).
285. THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES: A REPORT ON THE OPERATION OF THE
GUIDELINES SYSTEM AND SHORT-TERM IMPACTS ON DISPARITY IN SENTENCING, USE OF
INCARCERATION, AND PROSECUTORIAL DIScRETION AND PLEA BARGAINING, UNITED STATES
SENTENCING COMMISSION at 77 (1991) ("Mhe rate of defendant's choosing to enter guilty
pleas or stand trial has not changed appreciably as a result of [G]uideline implementation.").
286. See infra notes 290-92 and accompanying text.
287. See infra notes 293-97 and accompanying text.
288. See infra notes 298-300 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 48
these incentives provide enough motivation for defendants to plea bar-
gain." However, just because a judge or a prosecutor may disagree with
the provisions in the Guidelines does not provide a justifiable reason for
ignoring them.
(a) Twenty-Five Percent Spread Under Most Guideline Ranges
In most cases, the Guidelines provide a spread of approximately
twenty-five percent between the minimum and maximum applicable sen-
tence within the Guideline range. 2" A defendant who pleads guilty may
expect a sentence at the lower end of the range. Additionally, under §
6B1.2(c),29' a defendant can actually bargain for a specific sentence at the
lower end of the range. 2' This represents one significant incentive for
defendants to continue to plea bargain with prosecutors.
(b) Acceptance of Responsibility, § 3E1.1
Defendants who plead guilty may also qualify for, and bargain for,
an offense level reduction for acceptance of responsibility; 213 this, obvi-
ously, reduces a defendant's sentence beyond the original Guideline
range. Even the Justice Department, which instructs its prosecutors to
make sentence agreements "only if the terms conform to the appropriate
[Guidelines or depart for a legitimate reason,"2' recognizes the signifi-
cance of this inducement. In the Redbook, the Justice Department states:
The Redbook's discussion of sentence recommendations that depart
from the [G]uidelines concludes that a plea "should not be used as a ba-
sis for recommending a sentence that departs from the [G]uidelines."
The Redbook explains that substantial inducement for a defendant to
plead guilty can be offered within the [G]uidelines framework by rec-
ommending a sentence at the lower end of the applicable range together
with the two-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility. 295
This offense level reduction under acceptance of responsibility,
combined with a sentence bargain at the lower end of the Guideline
289. See supra note 284 and accompanying text.
290. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
291. GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 8, § 6B1.2(e).
292. See Nagel & Schulhofer, supra note 3, at 506.
293. See id.
294. Donald A. Purdy, Jr., Plea Bargaining: What Is The Problem And Who Is Responsi-
ble?, FED. SENT. REP., May/June 1996, at 333 (citing PROSECUTOR'S HANDBOOK, supra note
273, at 43).
295. Nagel & Schulhofer, supra note 3, at 506 (citing PROSECUTOR'S HANDBOOK, supra
note 273, at 43).
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range, represents a thirty-five percent reduction in sentencing.2' 6 It is
true that a judge retains the discretion to accept or reject a sentence bar-
gain calling for a sentence at the low end of the Guideline range and an
acceptance of responsibility reduction. However, if she rejects it, the de-
fendant still has the power to withdraw his guilty plea under Rule
11(e)(4). 29
(c) Substantial Assistance, § 5K1.1
A defendant may also receive an explicit Government recommenda-
tion for a substantial assistance downward departure.298 In some districts,
courts liberally grant motions for a departure based on substantial assis-
tance.29 This becomes very significant in the area of plea bargaining,
because an acceptance of responsibility reduction does not preclude a de-
parture for substantial assistance. In fact, the Guidelines state that sub-
stantial assistance must be considered independently of acceptance of re-
sponsibility.3"
(4) Covert Departures From the Guidelines Mask the Problems that the
Commission Needs to Recognize, Analyze, and Solve
The Commission created "policy statements [to] ensure that the basis
for any judicial decision to depart from the [G]uidelines will be explained
on the record."30 Only by forcing departures to be explained on the rec-
ord-especially those relating to plea bargains-can the Commission
"determine when and why the courts accept or reject plea agreements and
whether plea agreement practices are undermining the intent of the Sen-
tencing Reform Act."3" Only then can the Commission "further regulate
the plea agreement process" to correct any problems that have arisen.3 3
296. Donald A. Purdy, Jr. & Jeffrey Lawrence, Plea Agreements Under the Federal Sen-
tencing Guidelines, 26 CRIM. L. BULL. 483, 503 (1990); Purdy, supra note 294, at 333 n.17.
297. FED. R. CRM. P. 11(e)(4).
298. GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 8, § 5K1.1; Purdy & Goldsmith, supra note 190, at
35.
299. Yellen, supra note 166, at 340.
300. See supra note 119 and accompanying text; GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 8, §
5K1.1, Comment. (n.2) ("The sentencing reduction for assistance to authorities shall be consid-
ered independently of any reduction for acceptance of responsibility. Substantial assistance is
directed to the investigation and prosecution of criminal activities by persons other than the de-
fendant, while acceptance of responsibility is directed to the defendant's affirmative recognition
of responsibility for his own conduct.").
301. GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 8, § 6B, Intro. Comment.
302. Purdy, supra note 294, at 331 (quoting id. at Ch. 1, pt. A, Intro. 4(c)).
303. Id.
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Former Commissioner Ilene Nagel and Professor Stephen Schulhofer
have described the problem of covert Guideline circumvention as follows:
[Tihe Sentencing Commission should not automatically assume that
sentences resulting from [G]uldeline evasion are necessarily "wrong."
Sometimes they are. But sometimes [G]uideline circumvention pro-
duces arguably just results. The principal problem with [G]uideline cir-
cumvention is that circumvention, unlike overt downward departure, is
hidden and unsystematic. It occurs in a context that forecloses over-
sight and obscures accountability. These are ample reasons for bringing
circumvention into the open, so that its justifications and consequences
can be fully understood.30'
Using Rule 11(e) and plea bargaining to circumvent the Guidelines
represents one possible solution to a conflict that has arisen under the
Guidelines. However, if courts continue to use this "solution," the
Commission will be unable to appropriately analyze the problem as it will
not be fully discussed and acknowledged "on the record." 3' This is pre-
cisely the reason for the Chapter Six Policy Statements, for as long as
this problem continues to be "solved" secretly, the Commission will be
unable to provide a real and lasting solution.
D. The Solution
The Introduction to the Guidelines Manual states:
The Commission will collect data on the courts' plea practices and will
analyze this information to determine when and why the courts accept
or reject plea agreements and whether plea agreement practices are un-
dermining the intent of the Sentencing Reform Act. In light of this in-
formation and analysis, the Commission will seek to further regulate the
plea agreement process as appropriate. Importantly, if the policy state-
ments relating to plea agreements are followed, circumvention of the
Sentencing Reform Act and the [G]uidelines should not occur.306
The policy statements relating to plea agreements have not been fol-
lowed. Specifically, Rule 11(e)(1)(C) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure has been used to trump the § 601.2(c) policy statements relat-
ing to sentence agreements. Therefore, it is clear that circumvention of
the Guidelines has occurred. It is time for the Commission to act.
304. Nagel & Schulhofer, supra note 3, at 557.
305. See Purdy, supra note 294, at 331.
306. GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 8, ch. 1., pt. A, Intro. 4(c) (emphasis added).
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The Commission has two options. 7 First, as part of its on-going
statutory obligations, the Commission has the power to amend its policy
statements if abuses occur or areas for improvement are identified."'
However, because some jurisdictions do not feel bound by these policy
statements,3" this option is hollow and useless. The current policy state-
ments, in and of themselves, are exceedingly clear on the issue. It is the
weight to be accorded to them that is the controversial issue.
The second option represefits more fundamental change. In order to
adequately solve this controversy, the Commission should make a rec-
ommendation to Congress to promulgate a Guideline-as opposed to an-
other policy statement-that deals directly with the issue of sentence bar-
gaining. 310 This new Guideline should prohibit the practice of sentence
bargaining outside of the applicable Guideline range without valid reasons
for departure.
There are two studies currently occurring at the Commission that are
related to the practice of plea bargaining that will hopefully shed light on
this on-going problem. One deals with the use of substantial assistance
departures under § 5K1.1; the other is an overall assessment of the
Guidelines which will include a study on plea bargaining practices. 311 If
the Commission finds, in either of these studies, that the current incen-
tives under the Guidelines fail to provide enough motivation for defen-
dants to want to plea bargain, it should also recommend that Congress
grant the courts, the prosecutors, and defense counsel more bargaining
power to formulate appropriate sentence agreements. This could easily
be accomplished by providing for more substantial reductions pursuant to
acceptance of responsibility adjustments.
Conclusion
The legislative history of the Sentencing Act reveals Congress' well-
founded concern that plea negotiations might undermine the objectives of
307. Of course, the United States Supreme Court could also act by amending FED. R.
CRIM. P. 11(e) to defer to the Chapter Six Policy Statements. This Note, however, focuses on
Legislative solutions. The Commission should not wait for the Court to act.
308. Wilkins, supra note 16, at 190.
309. See supra notes 243-61 and accompanying text.
310. The Commission may also want to address the practices relating to Rule 11(e)(1)(A)
charge bargains or Rule 11(e)(1)(B) nonbinding sentence agreements. These areas, unfortu-
nately, are beyond the focus of this Note.
311. Purdy, supra note 294, at334.
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the Sentencing Guidelines.312 In particular, Congress was mindful of the
fact that prosecutors could rely on the traditional forms of plea bargaining
to "undercut the full impact of the [G]uideline sentencing system."
31 3
The Commission, however, decided against making drastic changes in
the practice of plea bargaining.31 4 Instead, it issued policy statements to
provide guidance to the courts and decided to address any potential
problems if and when they arose.315
Now that one has arisen, it is time for the Commission to take ac-
tion.
312. Alschuler, supra note 178, at 470.
313. THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES: A REPORT ON THE OPERATION OF THE
GUIDELINES SYSTEM AND SHORT-TERM IMPACTS ON DISPARITY IN SENTENCING, USE OF
INCARCERATION, AND PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION AND PLEA BARGAINING, UNITED STATES
SENTENCING COMMISSION, at 65 (1991).
314. See supra notes 216-17 and accompanying text.
315. See supra notes 217, 226-33 and accompanying text.
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